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''.Any intelligent woman who reads the marriage contract and then
goes into it, deserves all the consequences.·~
I NTRODUCTION

Isadora Duncan poked fun at "the" marriage con tr act. But t he
terms of marriage today differ considerably from the state-provided
terms of Duncan's 1922 marriage to a poet eighteen years her junior,
which in turn differed from Duncan's parents' marriage. Those everchanging marital rules belie claims that marriage is an unchanging
status ma ndated by God or Nature. To the extent that changes increase freedom to en ter and exit a marriage, as well as to tailor the
financial righ ts and dut ies of spouses vis-a-vis one another, they also
reveal contractual aspects of marriage. If marriage is indeed a con* Carole & Hanan Sibel Research Professor, University of Maryland F'nrncis IGng
Ca1·ey Law School. Many thanks are due to the University of Maryland law school for generous financia l support. to the ouLstanding staff at its Thurgood Marshall Law Library for
research support. and to Fred Hertz, Margy J<law, and participants at the F lorida State
UniversiLy College of Law's After Marriage symposium and a University ofMaxyland faculty workshop for helpful comments that clarified my thinking on key issues addressed in
t his Article.
1. ISADORA DUNCAN, MY Lim 200 (1928).
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tract-defined in black letter law as a legally binding promise2instead of an immutable status controlled by forces divine or biological, then most arguments against same-sex marriage bite the dust.
Long before marriage equality became a front line in the culture
wars, family scholars recognized the deep vein of contract running
through family law, 3 though disagreement persists on its particulars
and policy implications. Elizabeth Scott and her husband Robert see
marriage as a relational contract, "a long-term commitment to purs ue shared goals, the fulfillment of which will enhance the joint welfare of the parties."4 Margaret Brinig, in contrast, sees the law of
commercial contracts as lacking the concepts of ''love, trust, faithfulness, and sympathy" which she dubs "essentialO" to family life, so
she argues for a covenantal model of marriage that accounts for the
"solemn vows" that shape families.5 My contribution to this legal academic literature has been analogizing marriage to both corporations
and lending relationships.6 My forthcoming book, Love's Promises,
goes a step beyond law, contending that both contracts and nonbinding agreements that I call "deals" shape all kinds of families.7
But even the most contractarian commentators agree that marriage
is not entirely contractual. Instead most scholars see marriage as
moving along a continuum from status to contract, taking on a different mix of status and contract at various t imes and places.8 Different
proportions serve different social, political, and economic ends.
Today, the ratio of contract to status in American family law is
particularly high, between no-fault divorce, the general enforceability
of cohabitation and marital agreements, the rise of collaborative lawyering, widespread recognition of reproductive technology agreements, and t he increasing enforceability of open adoption agree-

2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 (1981).
3. See, e.g .. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractu.al Ordering of Marriage: A New
Model for State Policy. 70 CALIF. L. REV. 204. 208 (1982).
4. Efo:abet h S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage a.s Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1225, 1229 (1998).
5. See MARGARET F . BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOM ICS OF THE FA.MILY l, 3 (2000).
6. Martha M. Ertman. Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women :S
Work Throu.gh Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Maxtha M. Ertman. Marriage a.s a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction. 36 HAHV. C.R.-C.L. L .
REV. 79 (2001).
7. MAR'l'HA M. ERTMAN, LOVE'S PROMISES: How FORMAL ANO IN FORMAi, CON'l'RACTS
SH AP~: ALL KINDS o~· FAMILl~:s (forthcoming 2015) (on file with author).
8. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud. 100 CALi i>. L. REV. l, 10 (2012). J anet
Halley, however. contests this view, instead seeing the very contract/status distinction as a
vehicle for imposing classical legal formalism into family law. J anet Halley, What Is Fami·
ly Law?: A Genealogy Part 1, 23 YALE J.L. & Hm<IAN. l, 6-7 (2011); Jru1et Halley, What Is
Fam.ily lAw?: A Gen.ealog:y Part II, 23 YALE.J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 190-93 (2011).
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men ts. 9 Yet many people-judges and scholars included-persist in
seeing love and contracts as opposites. 10 This Article seeks to counter
that misperception by exploring a post- Windsor legal landscape
through a lens of contracts and deals.
I explore the question of what marital contracts might look like in
a post- Windsor world by zooming in on a common exchange in which
partners swap financial s upport for care of home, heaxth, and childxen alongside a promise of sexual relations. I call it the "paix bond
exchange." Because it plays an important role in marriage and other
long term r elationships, focusing on it helps answer the question of
whether gays will change marriage or marriage will change gays (or
both). In 2015, over a decade after Massachusetts became the first
state to recognize same-sex marriage and two years into federal
recognition of marriage equality, the terms of the average pair bond
exchange in gay couples differ from the terms of most straight couples' pair bond exchanges. Unless marriage equality makes gay couples act like straight spouses, that difference could lead same-sex
couples more frequently to contract around default family law rules
like sharing retixement savings that accrue during the marriage or
providing post-divorce income sharing through alimony.
This Art icle proceeds in four parts, each addressing a different
aspect of this exchange. Part I begins with an overview of the role of
exchange in marriage by cataloging four different disciplines' approach to that exchange (sociobiology, economics, anthropology, and
sociology). It then examines cases that illustrate family law's treatment of the three elements of that exchange--money, housework,
and sex.
Part II discusses quantitative data about pair bond exchanges
that show the different pair bond exchanges entered by straight and
gay couples. Part III switches t he focus to qualitative data about differences bet ween gay and straight pair bond exchanges. Both number s and stories indicate that generally speaking, gay couples have
more egalitarian relationships. They share housework more equitably and have more comparable incomes. But that is largely because
straight couples are more likely to have kids. Researchers who study
gay and straight couples raising kids find that about a third of
straight and gay-male couples have one parent at home full-time, just
a bit more than the one out of four lesbian-mom couples in which one
person keeps house full-time.U Moreover, while comparative data is
9. See ERTMAN. supra note 7, at xiii.
10. See, e.g., HARVILLE HENDRIX, GETIING THE LOVE YOU WANT: A GUIDE FOR
COUPLES 237-39 (1988); Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J.
2413, 24 16 -1 8 (1993) (reviewing RICHA.RI) A. P OSNb:R, S~:x ANO REASON (1992)).

11. Dan A. Black et a l.. The Economics of Lesbian and Cay Families, 21 J . ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 53, 62-63 (2007). 'fh at exchange may be less common among some sub-
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sca1·ce, there is some indication that heterosexual couples have b ecome more equal over the past few decades, with men changing more
diapers and women earning a greater percentage of the family income, while gay couples are, as one researcher put it, becoming ''heterosexualized," exhibiting less equality in housework and wages. 12
While the third element of pair bond exchanges-sex-matters
less for family law than it used to, the law largely ignores agreements about sex, from frequency to fidelity. But because the law is
not everything, it is worth noting the social science research indicates
that in this respect lesbian and gay-male couples pa1·t ways. While
only about five percent of straight and lesbian couples explicitly
agree that sex outside the marriage is okay, half of gay male couples
make agreements that allow for sex with other people. 13
Part IV concludes the Article by predicting how marriage equality
could change heterosexual marriage and/or same-sex coupling. If the
pair bond exchanges of most couples change, then family law doctrine
could and should adjust its default rules to reflect couples' new expectations. A glance at demographics suggests that forecasters of
family law evolution ought to follow three things: (1) the children of
same-sex couples, (2) the ethnographers who document how couples
actually divide financial and housekeeping responsibilities, and
(3) the heterosexuals.
Heterosexual practices are likely to be the most accurate predictor
of changes in marriage and the legal rules governing it. As of 2011,
around 114,000 same-sex couples were married (and another 108,000
or so in civil unions or registered domestic partnerships), compared
to fifty-six million different-sex couples. 14 It is hard to see how such a
tiny percentage of married couples could change the rules unless
much more powerful social and economic forces were behind these
changes. As Stephanie Coontz observes, marriage has been moving in
the direction of a partnership of equals seeking personal fulfillment
groups of gay couples. An in-depth study of fifty black lesbian couples fow1d that they highly value economic self-sufficiency and thus are less likely to embrace that stark version of
the pail· bond exchange. NlIGNON R. MOORE. INvlSIBLE FAl\filIES: GAY IDENTITIES,
RELAT10NSHIPS, ANO MOTHERHOOD AMONG BLACK WOMEN 153. 157, 160-61 (2011).
12. Gabrielle Gotta et al., Heterosexual, Lesbian, and Gay Male Relationships: A
Comparison of Couples in 1975 and 2000, 50 FAM. PROCESS 353. 372 (2011). One scholar
suggests that the pre- and post-marriage equality comparisons of households provide a
·'natural experiment" t hat should inform both policy and future research. Deborah A.
Wid.iss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721. 722 (2012).
l 3. See Gotta, supra note 12, aL 368.
14. Brief of Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae on the Merits in Support of Respondent
Windsor at 25-26, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (using
2010 census data to estimate the number of same-sex married couples and registered do·
mestic partnerships or civil wiions); Jonathru1 Vespa et al., America's Families and Living
Arrangements: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU at 3 (2013), available at h ttp://www.census.gov/
prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf.
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for over a century. L5 Though change will likely flow in both directions,
I suspect t hat marriage equality is more likely to change pair bond
exchanges among gay and lesbian couples than the marriages of heterosexual spouses. If social, legal, and economic support leads more
gays to have children, then the caregiving work those children require is likely to induce those couples who can afford it to have one
partner focus more on bread-winning while the other tends to the
health , education, and welfare of everyone in the household. Indeed,
as Nan Hunter predicts, that pattern could be one factor that pushes
family law to move away from providing different rules based on sexual orientation to dictating one set of rules for parents and another
for couples without children. 16
I. THE LONGSTANDING LINK BETWEEN
CONTRACT AND MARRIAGE

This Part explores the tight link between contract and marriage
by first mapping some ways that contractual thinking has shaped
marriage historically and then examining a few contemporary legal
doctrines that continue to presuppose an exchange of financial su pport for caregiving in marriage. It begins at a macro level, looking at
scholarship on intellectual frameworks that shape families and family law, and concludes wit h a more micro-level analysis of how family
law treats the property-sharing, care-giving, and sexual fidelity elements of the pair bond exchange.
A. The Big Picture of Contract in Marriage

Many scholars have viewed marriage through a contractual lens.
Most recently, William Eskridge, a long-t ime scholar of same-sex
marriage, provided a convincing account of changes in marriage rules
using the tools of contract theory: default rules, immutable rules, and
the rules designating how to opt out of a default, which he dubs
"override rules."17 By tracing family law's general move from mandat ory rules to default rules over the last century, he r eaffirms Henry
Maine's 1861 dictum that the move in progressive societies is often
from status to contract. 18 Where Eskridge provides an overview of
doctrines ranging from who is allowed to marry to grounds for divorce, I focus on one exchange that shapes daily life in many families,
15. Stephanie Coontz. The Heterosexual Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (July 5. 2005),
h ttp://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/opinion/05coontz.ht ml.
16. Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More
Questions 'l'hanAnswers. 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1877-78 (2012).
l 7. William N. Eskridge. ,Jr., Family l,aw Plurali..~m: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Ru.Les, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1889 (2012).
18. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: I TS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY
OF SOCIETY ANO T'l'S RE:LA'l'ION TO MorrnRN IDEAS 168· 70 (16t h ed. 1897).
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the pair bond exchange. Analyzing spouses' division of financial and
homemaking obligations should help lawmakers and law-shapers
make more informed decisions about the evolution of default rules
since default rules generally reflect what the people involved would
have agreed to had they talked about it. 19
No-fault divorce and marital contracting are nodal cases illustrating the trend toward private ordering. Both make marriage more contractual by treating marriage as a relationship with an existence and
terms dictated, in good part, by the people involved. Indeed, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act reflected that move away from status
and toward contract by re-naming divorce "dissolution," a term borrowed from the winding down of a business. 2° Consequently, baseball
star Barry Bonds could divorce his Swedish-born wife Susann in 2000
for irreconcilable differences and keep for himself much of the $43 million he brought home playing for the San Francisco Giants in addition
to the homes, cars, and other things purchased with that money. 21
Before courts enforced contracts that limited property-sharing and
alimony on divorce, marriage was more of a status- permanent once
entered, with largely unalterable terms. Courts justified the mandatory nature of those rules by citing marriage's immense value to families, society, and even civilization itself. As the Supreme Court famously put it in the 1888 case Maynard v. Hill ,
Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage.
The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to
various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested,
for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which
t here would be neither civilization nor progress. 22

Though Maynard concerned legislative divorce,23 the long shadow it
has cast over family law has supported marriage-as-status arguments against a wide range of reforms. Today that means same-sex
marriage, but back in the 1880s the Court was more likely concerned
with interracial marriage.
Just five years before deciding Maynard, the Court opted to uphold miscegenation laws, rejecting a contract-based argument that
19. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Ru,les, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-93 (1989).
20. U.M.D.A. §§ 301-16 (1974).
21. J11 re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 817. 838 (Cal. 2000); see also Ken Hoover.

Barry Bonds

Win.~

Big in Divorce Court/ He Get:; Both

Hou.~es-Pay

to Ex-Wife Cut 50%,

S.F. GATE (Mar. 9. 1996, 4:00 AM), http:l/www.sfgate.com/sports/article/Barry-Bonds-WinsBig-in-Divorce-Court-He-gets-2991024. php.
22. Maynard v. Hill. 125 U.S. 1.90, 211(J888).
23. See id. at 203.
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had made some headway in state courts.24 A number of states in the
former Confederacy had overturned bans on interracial marriage on
the grounds that marriage was a contract and miscegenation laws
ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1866's provision giving any citizen the same right that a white citizen
has to make and enforce contracts. 25 However, in the 1880s, white
supremacists sought to reinstate the ban, claiming that it did not violate principles of equal protection since the laws prevented both
blacks and whites from marrying outside their race. 26 In 1883, the
U.S. Supreme Court accepted this rationale as grounds for upholding
the ban on interracial marriage in Pace v. Alabama. 27
Rules about marriage have immense influence on other aspects of
social, political, and economic life. According to historian Peggy Pascoe, the bans on interracial marriage formed the backbone of the entire system of racial subordination. 28 Judicial and cultural resistance
to interracial marriage was so strong that the Court avoided those cases even after the twentieth century's civil rights movement was well
underway. 29 Not until 1967 would the Supreme Court finally overrule
Pace in Loving v. Virginia.30 Little did those justices guess that they
were greasing the cultural and legal tracks for same-sex couples to
sign on to the state-supplied terms of the marriage contract.
But marriage is far too old, varied, and complex an institution to
be pinned down to either contract or status . Sociologist Kimberly
Richman captured this truth in interviews with same-sex newlyweds
in California and Massachusetts.31 Kat hy, who married her partner
Andrea in Massachusetts, initially wanted to marry in order to ensure access in an emergency, a fear borne of a trip to the emergency
room early in their relat ionship. 32 But, Kathy told Richman, the experience of going to City Hall to pick up their marriage license exceeded those practical bounds:
I felt almost as moved by that than at any part of the ceremony, to
see this official form that was stamped with our names on it and
our parents' names on it, our add1·ess and that said it was ''legal."
24. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584-85 (1883).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. X:IV; Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-82 (2012).
26. P EGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATU RALLY: M rSCEGENA'rlON LAW AND THE MAJUNG
OP RACE IN AiVIER ICA 68 (2009).
27. 106 U.S. at 584-85.
28. PASCOE, supra note 26, at 201.
29. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virgin·
ia, 1860s-1960s, 70 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 371. 415-16 (1994).
30. Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. l, 12 (1967).
31. See K!MSERLY D. RlCHMAN, LJCENSE TO WED: WHAT LE:GAL MARRJAGE MEANS TO
SA11H:·SE:x COUPLES (2014).
32. Id. at 146-67.
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It said we were married as if solemnizing this document. That was
an incredible thing. a3

Aleda, a San Francisco woman, newly wed to her partner Anne Marie
after a decade together, marveled at a "lovely feeling" of legitimacy
and ''being part of a big picture": "It's like you just dismiss something ... you may want to be part of it but you know that you can't
be ... there was just something incredibly legitimate about it that I
finally got to experience."34
Aleda summed it up with the phrase "socially recognizable contract," explaining that she used to think of "the whole marriage thing"
as "really just a legal contract," but now sees its "social implications.''35
I, too, remember my trip to City Hall with my now-wife to pick up
our marriage license, back in 2009. The delight that comes with a
happy marriage, as well as the great good fortune to live in the era
when the law decided to honor our family, landed that green license,
framed, on our dining room wall.
Marriage seems to retain a mix of status and contract through its
many incarnations. Take fault-based divorce. On first glance, no-fault
divorce looks like a move from status to contract because it allows
unhappy spouses to terminate a marriage in much the way that unhappy business partners can terminate their "us-ness." But faultbased divorce also contained contractual elements. If a husband
breached his promise to forsake all others, his wife could cancel the
marriage contract (divorce) and get damages (more property, alimony).36 If the wife was the cheater, her husband could get a divorce and
recover damages by being excused from paying alimony .37
The complex inte1·play between status and contract in marriage is
hardly surprising given the many roles that marriage plays in social,
economic, psychological, and other aspects of peoples' lives. The importance of marriage-and pair bond exchanges within marriageshas generated an immense literature on marriage. The next Section
focuses on one aspect of that literature, the way that scholars in four
disciplines have conceived of the pair bond exchange. Each discipline,
we will see, has coined a phrase to describe the swap that reflects
each discipline's particular focus.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 144.
35. Id. at 145.
36. No-fault regimes sometimes continue to account l'or fault. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Faull in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J.
2525, 2532-38 (1995).
37. Id. at 2535-38, 2558.
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B. One Swap with Many Names
The pair bond exchange involves one partner doing more to keep
up the bank balance while the other does more to keep the home
front functioning, with sex as part of the deal. Its importance to family life is shown by the fact that scholars of evolution, economics, anthropology, and sociology have all recognized and examined it. While
scholars in these fields use different terms, I propose the term "pair
bond exchange" as a cross-over term that captures much of the various disciplines' views .

1. Sociobiology: The Sex Contract
According to socio-biologists like Helen Fisher and E.0. Wilson,
our proto-human ancestors entered an exchange that Fisher calls the
"sex contract."38 Women exchanged sexual exclusivity and foraged
food for men's bounty from the hunt, a bit of p1·otection, and help
with the children. 39 The deal served the larger goal, they contend, of
getting their genes to the next generation.40 As Wilson explains, the
especially slow, expensive process of raising a human infant to maturity required a lot of help, giving our ancestors who could strike
deals with one another a leg up in getting their genes to the next
generation:
Human beings, as typical large primates, breed slowly. Moth ers
carry fetuses for nine months and afterward are encumbered by infants and small children who require milk at frequent intervals
through the day. It is to t he advantage of each woman of the
hunter-gatherer band to secure the allegiance of men who will contribute meat and hides while sharing the labor of child-rearing. It
is to the reciprocal advantage of each man to obtain exclusive sexual rights to women and to monopolize their economic productivity. If the evidence from hunter-gath erer life has been correctly interpreted, the exchange has resulted in near universality of the
paii- bond and the prevalence of extended fa milies with men and
their wives forming the nucleus. 4 L

But even assuming the primacy of natural selection in shaping human social arrangements, first-generation socio-biologists like Wilson
failed to notice that genes need a lot more than bare reproduction to
get to the next generation.

38. HELENE. FISHER, 'l'HE SEX CONTRACT: THE EVOLUTION OF Hill1AN BEHAVIOR 85105 (1982); EDWARD 0 . WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 137-40 (rev. ed. 2004).
39. FISHER, supra note 38. at 89-91; WILSON. supra note 38. at 139-40.
40. See RI CHARD D AWKJNS, THE SEL~'ISll GENE 117-23 (2d prlg. 1977); see also
WILSON, supra note 38. at 137-40.
41. WILSON, supra note 38, at 139 (emphases added).
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As the saying goes, it takes a village to raise a child . A second
type of relationship-creating exchange has more recently come to
ligh t in work by an th ropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy and psychologist
Shelley Taylor. Both docu ment ancient as well as con temporary exchanges a mong women- often mothers- to help raise their children
and care for other close intimates. 42 If t hese evolutionary scientists
are correct, both pair-bonding and tending enabled us to evolve into
a species apart.
Family law could, and perhaps should, recognize all of the tending
exchanges that shape family life, but it does not. 43 For better or for
worse, marriage remains the defining feature of "family" for purposes
of legal doctrine, so this Article focuses on the role of the marital pa ir
bond exchange. The reciprocal exchange at the heart of the general
rules of property and income sharing in marriage may well explain
wh y legal r ules have long described marriage as a civil contract.'14

2. Economics: Specialization
Economists have their own language to describe pair bond exchanges, though many economists' view of families-and th us family
law-fits so well with sociobiology that Richard Posner's 1992 book Sex
and Reason posits what he dubs a ''bioeconomic" theory of sexual conduct and regulation.45 Following Gary Becker, scholars of the area of
42. SARAH BLAf'FER HTWY. MOTHERS AND 0'rHERS: T HE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF
MUTUAL UNUERSTANO ING (2009); SHELV:Y E. TAYLOR. 'l'HE TENDING TNSTJNCT: WOMEN,
MEN. AND THE BIOLOGY OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS (2002).
43. For various models of how family law might. recognize relat.ionships beyond marriage. see, for example, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 'l'HE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 'fWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRL-\GE: VALUING ALL FAMJLIES UNDER THE LAW (Michael
Bronski ed., 2008); Laura 1'. Kessler. Community Parenting. 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 47
(2007); Laura A . Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007).
44. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *433. Family law. of course. has changed
greatly since Blackstone. 1n the eighteenth century, the common law treated women and
chilcfren as essentially property of men, subject to the control and discipline of the man of
theii· household. Over the past 150 years, however, family law rules have changed to treat
women and childxen as more fully human. for example, by recognizing wives' rights to con·
tract and own properly, protecting women and children from domestic viole nce, and also
treating fathers of non-mari ta l chi ldren as legal faLhers. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Mod-

ernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights lo Earnings, 1860-1930, 82
Gw. L.J. 2127 (1994); ,Joseph Warren, H/J,shand's Right lo Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L .
REV. 421 (1925). Accordingly. I make no claim thaL the ancient. provenance of the pair bond
deals I discuss has produced identical legal rules over time a11d place. Such a claim would
be paten tly false.
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992). The fam ily resemblance may be in
part because sociobiology and legal economics came of age together, bet.ween Richard D awkins' 1976 The Selfish Gene, Wilson's 1975 Sociobiology. and Gary Becker's 1979 A Treatise
on the Family. As early as 1976. Becker sketched out the complementarity of the two approaches. Gary S. Becker. Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology, 14 ,J. ECON. L!'rgRA'l'URE 817 (l.976).
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research known as the new home economics call the pair bond exchange "specialization."46
These home economists presuppose a division of household tasks
that characterized U.S. households more in the 1950s than today. 47
In this view, a wage earner "specializes" in bringing home the bacon,
and his homemaking spouse specializes in frying it up in a pan. That
is efficient, according to these economists, because each person can
get really good at his or her role, and they do not have to waste time
deciding who will make dinner every night.
Contract is central to this view of marriage, though most commentators acknowledge that marriage is a special kind of contract with
many terms provided by the state instead of the s pouses themselves.
Pos ner explicitly compares marriage contracts to a business partnership, contending that courts' failure t o fully value homemakers' contribution to families "destabilizes marriage, just as business partnerships
would be destabilized if courts systematically undercompensated one
of the partners upon the dissolution of the partnership."48 Homemakers, Posner asserts, need the equivalent of contractual protection to
invest time, financial resources, and effort in the marriage.49
In this view no-fault divorce coupled with limited alimony rights
discourages specialization by making marriage more like employment -at -will than a long-term arrangement in which partners can
safely invest their time and effort. 50 No-fault and lack of alimony,
according to these home economists, could inefficiently discourage
specialization. 51
Some new home economists see biological differences between
men and women as providing an additional element of efficiency.
Lloyd Cohen, for example, posits that men and women play gender
roles in marriage because doing so is economically efficient, and perhaps biologically determined. 52 Thus, he argues, women make mar46. GARY S. BECl<ER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed.
1991); Robert A. Pollak. Cary Becker's Contribu.tions to Family and Household Economics,
l REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD lll, 112 (2003) ("[T]he economics of Lhe family is Gary Becker's
creation.").
47. JUOrJ'H STACEY, TN 'l'HF. NAME OF THE FAMI LY: RETH I Nl\I NG FA,\<I TLY VALUES I N T HE
POSTMODERN ACE 90 (1996).
48. POSNER. supra note 45. aL 248.
49. Id.
50. See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I Cave Him the Best
Years of My Life," 16 ,J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 29~) (1987); see also R ICHARD A. POSN~:R,
ECONOM IC ANALYSIS OF LAW 164 (5th ed. 1998). It is impot·tan t to note thaL this insighL
dilfors l'rom saying Lhat one spouse employs t he other, because the central economic premise is that they employ each other. See id. at 157.
5l. See, e.g., BECKER, su.pra note 46. aL 39; see also Lloyd R. Cohen. RhetorU;, the Unnatural Family, and Women~5 Work, 81 VA. L. Rev. 2275, 2284-85 (1995).
52. See Cohen, supra note 51. at 2285.
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riage-specific investments early in marriage, such as specializing in
the domestic rather than market labor (by, for example, taking primary childcare responsibility) and foregoing the opportunity to marry
someone else. Men, he argues, have little to invest in the early years
of marriage and instead invest in their personal human capital. 53 As
the marriage progresses, according to Cohen, the wife's value on the
remarriage market declines (even more so if she has children), as do
her options to compete in the wage labor market. 54 This pattern, traditionalist legal economists contend, encourages opportunism by
the husband by allowing him to benefit from the wife's earlymarriage contributions to his earning potential and then leave. 55 A
divorce rule imposing exit costs (i.e., alimony, having to prove fault)
would deter this opportunism.56 While the new home economics may
seem hopelessly dated, recent data confirm that the longer a couple is
married the more specialized husbands and wives become in either
providing or homemaking. 57
Feminists have long criticized economists' valorization of gendered
specialization of household labor, pointing out that s pecialization arguments ignore nonmonetary costs, possibilities of non-gendered specialization, and the law of diminishing r eturns .58 Economist Barbara
Bergmann dismisses its conclusions as "preposterous," based on an
approach she deems "fatally simplistic and, where not irrelevant ... misleading."59 Legal economist Robert Pollak critiques the
assumptions on which it rests. 60 When it comes to the complementary
claims of sociobiology, paleontologist Steven Jay Gould derides them
as simplistic "Just So stories."6 t
See Cohen. supra note 50. at 287.
See id. at 273.
Elisabeth M. Lru1des. Economics of Alimony. 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 40 (1978).
Cohen, su,pra note 50. a t 285. While the bulk of Cohen's ruialysis seems aimed at
critiquing no-faul t divorce. and he initially sees fault as a "powerful" solut ion to t he proble ms of ma le opportunism in marriage. he stops short of endorsing a return to fault-based
divorce because of the impossibility of a specific performance remedy. Cohen, supra note
53.
54.
55.
56.

50. at 299-300.
57. Axielle Kuperberg, Reassessing Differences in Work and Income in Cohabitation
and Marriage, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 688 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Margaxet F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency.
82 GEO. L.J. 2461. 2469-73 (1994); Alm Laquer Estin. Can Families Be Efficient? A Femi·
nist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (1996); Jana B. Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Ee.anomic Justification of Alimony, 82 GEO.
L.J. 2423, 2437-53 (1994).
59. Barbara R. Bergmann. Becl~r's Theory of the Family: Prepost.erous Conclusions.
39 CH/\LLENG~: 9, 9 (1996).

60. Pollak, supra note 46.
61. Stephen Jay Gould. Sociobiology: 1'he Art of Storytelling, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 16.
1978, at 530. Numerous law professors, myself included, sharply criticized Posnet's book
Sex and Reason for its views of women ru1d the role of reproduction in sexuality as well as
its deployment of economic theory to human sexuality. See Maxtha Ertman. De11:yi11g the
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But the evidence that most undermines Becker's view of gendered
specialization is t he economy itself. Wit h the demise of manufacturing in the Unit ed States and the rise of ser vice and informat ion sectors, women have begun to far e better in man y job markets than
men .62 That pattern has translated to more women suppor ting their
families and more men doing more of the shopping, cooking, cleaning,
and homework help t hat keeps a family happy and healthy. Yet gendered patterns remain. In 1989 sociologist Arlie Hochschild documented what she called t he "Second Shift" of house work that women
do in addition to wage labor, a patt ern that has not changed much ,
according to journalist Brigid Schulte's 2014 book Overwhelmed.63
Schulte urges women to let go of being the go-t o person for tending, delegating t asks like dinner and diapers to husbands even if t hat
means no vegetables and backwards diapers.64 It is a popular message t hese days, also ma de by Facebook COO and L ean I n author
Sheryl Sandberg.65 J ournalists Paula Szuch man and J enny Anderson's 2011 book Spousonomics likewise supports decoupling gender
from tasks around the house, t hough they do argue for the efficiency
of specialization .66
For t he moment , at least, gendered differences persist . Mothers in
particula r face daunt ing obstacles to fully engaging in wage labor
between employment discrimination that law pr ofessor Joan Williams has dubbed "the maternal wall" and social and emotional pulls
toward t he home front. 67 While a 2013 Pew study r eported th at forty
percen t of women are the prime breadwinners in their household,
many of t hose women are single mothers .68 On an average day in
Secret of Joy: A Critique of Posner's Theory of Sexuality. 45 STAN. L . REV. 1485 (1993);
Gillian K. Hadfield. Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual
Man. 106 HARV. L. REV. 479 (1992) (book review).
62. See LtZA MUNDY, THE RlCHER SEX: How THE NEW MAJORITY OF FEMALE
BREAJ)W JNNERS IS TRANSFORMING SEX, LOVE, ANO FAMll.Y (2012); HANNA ROSI N, THE ENO
OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 3-5 (2012).
63. Ml.IE RUSSEl.l. HOCHSCHtLD & ANNE MACH UNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (1989); BRIGlD
SCHULTE, O VERWHELMED: WORK , LOVE, AND PLAY WHEN NO ONE HAS'l'HETrME 16(2014).
64. SCHUl.TE, supra nole 63, ai 283.
65. See SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD 10809 (2013).
66. PAULA SZUCHMAN & JENNY ANDERSON, SPOUSONOMICS: USING ECONOMICS TO
MASTER LOVE. MARRtAGE. AND D IRTY DISHES 14-19 (2011). 'l'he common tendency to resist
that kind of mixing of love and economic r hetoric seems to have led t he publisher to re -title
t he book in paperback [l's Not You, It's lh.e Dishes: How to Minimize Conflict and Maximize
Happiness in Your Relationship in 2012.
67. ,JOAN C. W I Ll,IAMS. RESHAPI NG 'l'HI~ WORK-FAM ILY D E:BA'l'~: : WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 5 (2010); see al.so MARGARET KLAW. KEEPI NG 11' C[VI L: T HE CAS~: OF THE PRENUP /\ND THE: P ORSCHE: & 0 'l'HE:H TRUE ACCOUNTS FROM THE FILES OF A FAM l l.Y LAWYEH

239-42 (2013).
68. WENDY WANG ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., BREADWINNER MOMS (2013). available at
http://www.pewsocia ltrends.org/liles/2013/05/Breadwinner_moms_Jina].pdf.
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2013, only nineteen percent of men did housework like cleaning or
laundry, compared to forty-nine percent of women. 69 Mothers of
young children spent 1.1 hours bathing or feeding them each day, two
and a half times more than fathers, who spent just twenty-six
minutes on t hese tasks. 70 Not s urprisingly, men, on average, enjoy
t hirty minutes more leisure time a day than women do. 71
All that data supports two points that relate to marital contracting in a post- Windsor world. First, families need both homemaking
and financial support to thrive. Second, in most families one s pouse
still does more of one than the other, though the link between gender
and that labor is not as tight as it once was.

3. Anthropology: Gift Exchanges
Anthropologist Marcel Mauss's model addresses the concerns
some scholars raise about economic views of how families operate by
acknowledging t he role of emotion and culture in the pair bond exchange. According t o Mauss, a gift usually comes with an obligation to
reciprocate, transforming the seemingly unilateral gift into a backand-forth transaction that creates a social and even s pfritual bond.72 A
slacker husband, in this view, dishonors himself by failing to reciprocate all of his wife's "gifts." She would be better off finding someone
more adept at holding up his end of what Mauss calls "gift exchanges."
Expectations of reciprocity also hold sway outside the family. Tithing ten percent of your income is part of many religious communities,
and some people say it helps pave the way to eternal life. Parents
take turns carpooling to soccer practice. Colleagues swap informat ion
to get ahead at work. It is hard to imagine any kind of genuine, lasting relationship that does not include both giving and getting. People
do not experience this pattern as a tit-for-tat with precise accounting,
but instead something m01·e along the lines of a t it -for-two-or-threet ats, a mix of gift and exchange. 73

4. Sociology: Economic Lives
To my mind Princeton sociologist Viviana Zelizer's work on overlaps between love and exchange provides the best analytic framework
to explore pair bond exchanges because it incorporates the insights of
69. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor. American Time Use
Sm·vey - 2013 (June 18, 2014. lO:OOAM), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/atus. pelf.
70. Id.
7 l. See Liana C. Sayer, Gender, Ti.me and Inequality: Trends in Women's and Men's
Paid Work, Unpaid Work and Free Ti.me, 84 Soc. FORCES 285. 296 (2005).
72. MARCE:L MAUSS, THE GWl' 13-14 (W.D. Halls trruis .. 1990).
73. See RICHARD D AWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (3d ed. 2006).
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economics and anthropology alongside her home discipline, sociology.
Her major contribution is giving us language to differentiate various
views of what happens when love and contracts overlap.74 First, she
dubs the most common view as "Hostile Worlds."75
Hostile Worlds approaches see sharp, impermeable boundaries
between money and contested commodities like love, babies, and
body paxts and claim that any overlap between markets and intimacy
will contaminate one or both. 76 Host ile Worlds analysis treats love
and contracts as realms so far away from each other that one's currency has no meaning or value in the other. 77 For example, the court
in the 1988 Baby M s uxrogacy case refused to enforce a surrogacy
contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern, declaring
that "ft]he1·e are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy."78 Yet if people could not contract in and out of parenthood
for a price, sperm banks like the California Cryobank, which buy
s perm from "donors" and sell it to would-be mothers, could not exist.79
Those sales are entirely lawful, protected by both state statutes and
judicial opinions.so
Courts also have taken a Hostile Worlds approach when examining pair bond exchanges. Back in 1889, the Iowa Supreme Court
t reated Nancy Miller's homemaking labor as a puxe gift when it refused to enforce her husband Robert's formal, written promise to pay
her two hundred dollars a year to "keep her home and family in a
comfortable and reasonably good condition" in exchange for his
providing "the necessary expenses of the family." 81 The Millers were
trying to patch things up after Robert ran around with other women.82 Alongside promises to pay for homemaking, they agreed that
"past subjects and causes of dispute, disagreement, and complaint"
would be "absolutely ignored and buried."83 But rather than enforce
the Millers' caxefully w01·ded reconciliation agreement, the court demoted it t o a mere deal because, it reasoned, Nancy did only what
"the law [already] required her to do."84
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

A. z~:LJZER. THE P URCHASE Of IN't'ClvlACY 22 (2007).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 22.
Jn re Baby M. 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).

VLVIANA

See D EBORA L. SPAR. THE B ABY BUSINESS:
DRlVE 'rH E COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 39 (2006).

How MONEY,

SCIENCE, AND POLITICS

80. ERTMAN, supra note 7. at 27-66.
81. Miller v. Miller, 42 N.W. 641, 641(Iowa1889).
82. The detail about Mr. MiUer's wandering appears in an earlier opinion in t he same
case. Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464. 464 (Iowa 1887).
83. Miller. 42 N.W. at 641.
84. Id. at 642.
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Zelizer also coined a term that captures the essence of the main
alternative to Hostile Worlds views. Seeing Chicago-school la w and
economics scholars like Becker and Posner as reducing family to
"nothing but" rational market exchanges, sh e labels that analytical
error "Nothing But."85 A Nothing But approach sees the world as
t ransacting bus iness of all sorts in a single currency, from sex to
strawberries.86 Through that lens, an interaction is all economic exchange or all something else like coercion.87
According to Zelizer, both Hostile Worlds and Nothing But views
distort the reality of family life. Seeing a marriage as Nothing But a
self-inter ested maximizat ion of one's wealth or presence in the gene
pool ignores crucial aspects of social and emotional life,88 just as a
Hostile Worlds view of marriage cannot explain why legal rules car efully calibrate spouses' financial rights and duties. 89 Nothing But
views bleach out love and other emotions, while Hostile Worlds approach es bleach out exchange elem ents of intimacy. Out of the rubble
of the now-discredited Hostile Worlds and Nothing But views of family exchanges, Zelizer offers her own approach, which maps the way
t hat markets bot h shape and are shaped by social t ies. She calls it
"Economic Lives."90
Viewing th e details of exchange within families through t h e lens
of Economic Lives would allow emotions that make marriage, as the
n ewly-wed Aleda put it, "a socially r ecognized contract"91 and also
help law do a better job at valuing t h e tending half of t h e pair bond
exchange.

C. Family Law Treatment of the Pair Bond Exchange
Family law has long recognized the pair bond exchange, though its
rules have treated t he elements-property-sharing, homemaking, and
sex- differently over time. Moreover, like the scholarship r eviewed
above, family law has its own terminology to describe the exchange.
The traditional "essentials" of marriage are a swap of financial
support for domestic services, with sexual access and exclusivity included.92 Historically, the rules of coverture required a husband to
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

ZELIZER. supra note 74, at 29.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 27.

VIVIANA A. ZEL!7.ER, ECONOM IC LIVES: How CULTURE S HAPES THE ECONOMY
(2011). In eai·lier work, she dubbed t he interplay between exchruige and int imacy "connect-

ed lives." ld. at 4; ZELIZER, supra note 74, at 32-35.
91. See supra noLe 35 and accompanying text.
92. Twila L. Perry, 1'he "Essentials of Marriage': Reconsidering the Duty of Suppo1t
and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEtvn NISM 1, 8-9 (2003).
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pay for his wife's "necessaries" and required a wife to care for the
home and children.93 Until the 1970s, the sexual access element justified the marital rape exception, relieving a husband of liability for
taking that which was already his (sexual access to his wife). 94
Though today marital rape is a crime, thanks to the feminist
movement,95 sex remains an "essential" of marriage in some ways.
Some states impose lighter penalties for marital rape than rape by a
stranger.96 Outside the rape context, refusal to engage in sexual relations can be grounds for divorce in some states, and concealed impotence can be grounds for an annulment. 97 The essentials of marriage,
sometimes called "the duty of support and services," remain "deeply
entrenched" in family law doctrines. 98 Entrenched as the idea is, the
seismic changes in marriages over the twentieth and early twentyfirst century make both judges and scholars shy away from the
phrase "essentials of marriage."
My term-pair bond exchange-may fare better. New language
helps us think in new ways, and the phrase "pair bond" evokes the
emotional closeness that our contemporary ideals of companionate
marriage strive for. It also remains relatively free from some of the
gendered constraints of the old view of marital obligations like obedience of wives to husbands. Finally, the term "exchange" recognizes
the role of reciprocity in marital relationships, which has both material and emotional benefits.
Exchange, in my mind, is often more important than whether a
particular exchange is legally binding. Families a1·e shaped by both
legally binding agreements--contracts99-and agreements that courts
would not enforce, which I call "deals."LOO Some agreements- like selling babies or a swap of I'll-cook-if-you-clean-up- are mere deals because they violate public policy or are too small or informal for courts
to get involved with. 101 Some deals, like baby-selling, are also crimes.
But most are entirely lawful. They matter despite the fact that the
people involved never expect them to get to court. Think of common
household arrangements like agreeing to keep a kosher kitchen or
spouses' half-joking pact that "no one gets fat." No one would sue, yet
these deals structure relationships. Deals can be big things like sex93. ld. at 3.
94. ld. at 30.
95. Eskridge, supra noLe 17. at 1914-15.
96. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper liiferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1490-91 (2003).
97. Perry. supra note 92, at 30.
98. Id. at 7.
99. Rl':S'l'A'l'F.MENT (SF.CONO) Of CON'l'RACTS § 1 (1981).
100. See ERTMAN. supra note 7.
101. RF.S'l'A'l'F.MENT (SF.CONO) OJ> CON'l'RACTS §§ 33, 1 10, 126-27 (1981).
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ual fidelity or casual, implicit, daily household exchanges about
laundry and lawn care. They shape intimate relationships by creating expectations of reciprocity and grounds for changing the relationship when one person is not holding up his or her end of the deal.
The distinction bet ween contracts and deals becomes particularly
useful in discussing family law's treatment of pair bond exchanges.
Legal doct rine treats the property-sharing part of the pair bond exchange as contractual, the sex part as a mere deal, and the homemaking part as something in between.

1. Property and Income Sharing
Most marriages are governed by the t erms of the state-supplied
marriage contract. As a general matter that means that courts do not
enforce contracts that spouses enter wit h one another during a marriage, but when a marriage ends by divorce, family law mandates
that s pouses split property they acquired during the marriage.to 2
(Likewise, when one spouse dies, t he other gets a share of marital
property.) That sharing is just ified by an oft-implicit presumption
that both wage-earning and homemaking contribute to families. 103
The 2008 divorce of Claire and Samuel Faiman illustrates the presumption, though the court did not explicitly justify its holding on t he
grounds t hat marriage is a partn ership. 104 Claire and Samuel Faiman
married late in life, when she was sixty-one and he ten years older. 105
Both were divorced, with children from their earlier marriages.106 Because Samuel's home and real estate business were in Connecticut,
Claire had to leave her twenty-five-year job in a Scarsdale, New
York, synagogue, the house she had lived in for over three decades,
and the community where she had raised her children. t 07 While neit her Claire nor Samuel was rich, his net worth (around $2.2 million)
was around ten times hers. tos As wit h many couples, their arrangement reflected t he pair bond exchange, though he was stingier and
more controlling than most providers.
Samuel paid for most household expenses, giving Claire a weekly
shopping "allowance" of one hundred fifty to three hundred dollars,

102. See 3 ArlNOLO H. RUTKIN, FAMI LY LAw & PRACTICE (2014); Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J .L. & POL'Y 225. 235 (2011).
103. See U.M.D.A. § 307 (1974).
104. Faiman v. Faiman, No. FA074028181. 2008 WL 5481382 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.
5. 2008).
105. Id. at *l.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id. at *l.
108. la. at *8.
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but withholding it when they went on trips. 109 He kept control over
the bank accounts and did not make her an owner of their home. 110
She paid for her personal expenses out of her modest social security
payments. u 1 Despite Samuel's tightfisted ways, Claire performed her
part of the exchange, shopping, cooking, and caring for him during a
triple bypass surgery, colon cancer, and leukemia that required
chemotherapy. u 2 In addition to changing his bandages and colostomy
bag, she also managed the household and business accounts when he
could not, though he removed her name from the accounts as soon as
he recovered.113 Even during their divorce trial she served him breakfast, lunch, and dinner every day.114 Though Samuel had many
faults- the judge described him as "secretive and controlling," "rude,
and even physically abusive"-he at least was honest, testifying at
trial that Claire was a "dutiful wife who kept a nice home." 115
You cannot help but wonder why she put up with him. She did
consider leaving when, two years into the marriage, he went to visit
an old girlfriend in New Hampshire, leaving a note on the refrigerator saying he would be back the next day .116 Claire stayed because,
she explained to the court, she "loved him very much" and didn't
want a divorce. 117 Though she did not say so on the record, she also
may have stayed because she had given away to her son her Scarsdale house-her only significant asset- and because Samuel had demanded a prenup three days before their wedding. 118
Six weeks before the ceremony, Samuel had said that he wanted a
prenup.119 But after Claire talked to an attorney and the couple went
to the library to look at some forms, Samuel decided he did not need
a prenup. t2o Then he changed his mind again. 121 He called Claire in
New York, where she was still working for the synagogue, and told
her she had to come to Connecticut because they had "some papers to
sign."t22 She got permission of her rabbi-also her employer-to leave

109.
llO.
11 1.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. a t *2.
ld. a t *1. *4 .
id. a t *4.
id.
id. a t *3-4.
ld. a t *3.
ld.
Id. at *l. *5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. a t *5.
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work early, and drove an hour and a half to his house. 123 He was
wait ing for her in the driveway and drove the two of them to his lawyer's office. 124 Ther e sh e met Samuel's lawyer and the lawyer he had
gotten for her, and sh e saw the prenup for the first time. 125 She was
"all shook up," she testified, and surprised because she t hought t he
papers would be about Samuel giving her $100,000 so sh e wouldn't
have problems with his children. 126 Instead, the agreement said that
he would keep all t h e money and property to himself. t 27 The attorney
who met with h er for fifteen or thirty minutes testified that she
seemed "surprised at what was b eing discussed." 128 Samuel t old her
"no agreement, no wedding." 129 Claire didn't s ign it right away. Instead, she took it home, and the next day she signed it wit hout ever
reading it.130
Claire and Samuel did divorce in 2008, after twenty years t ogether.131 She was eighty-one and he was ninety-one but still strong
enough to try to fight off her claim to any wealth acquired during
their marriage. 132 The question at trial was whether to enforce the
prenup that waived Claire's right to alimony or any property held in
Samuel's name. 133 That meant n early all th e property, because h e
had made sure that just about everything was his and his alone. The
court ruled in Claire's favor and refused to enforce the premarital
agreement. 13'1
In Faiman v. Faiman, the judge reasoned that Claire should get
alimony from Samuel because h er signat ure was not fully voluntary.135 She did not have time to review th e agreement, Samuel's
lawyer drafted the agreement and picked Claire's lawyer, and no one
told her what she was giving up. 136 Although the formal holding turns
on voluntariness, partnership reasoning seems to underlie that outcome. A footnote mentions that "[t]he investment of human capital in
h omemaking has worth," 137 and the court's detailed account of all
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. a t
id. a t
ld. a t
ld.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
id. a t

*7.
*6.
*6. *9.
*5.
*l.

*l. *7.
*10.
*9.
*4 n .7 (quoting O'Neill v. O'Neill, 536 A.2d 978, 984 (Co1m. App. Ct. 1988)).
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Claire did for Samuel suggests that the judge found it simply unfair
to allocate all marital property to Samuel, leaving Claire with "absolutely nothing other than the five-year-old car that she is driving."138
The court may have also seen Samuel visiting that old girlfriend as a
breach of his promise to forsake all others, though as the case on fidelity agreements below shows, courts generally refuse to enforce
that part of pair bond exchanges.
Samuel could, of course, have contracted around at least some of
this property sharing by fully disclosing his assets and giving Claire
sufficient time to review the prenup's terms and get independent legal counsel. The fact that some states impose additional limits like
refusing to enforce alimony-limiting agreements, requiring substantive fairness, or placing the burden of proof on the person seeking to
hoard property further suggests that family law can make the property-sharing element of the pair bond exchange a particularly sticky
default rule. 139
Before the 1970s, most courts treated any attempt to contract out
of property sharing at divorce as merely a deal because, they reasoned, the government set the terms of the marriage contract, not the
spouses themselves. 140 Some scholars argue family law should correct
the problem of devalued caregiving by returning to the old rule that
treated prenups that limited property sharing on divorce as mere
deals. 14 1 But the long history of family exchanges argues for spouses
holding onto their contractual freedom. Instead, courts could recognize that a property-hoarding prenup fundamentally alters a couple's
pair bond exchange. That would mean recognizing as contractual the
homemaking part of the pair bond exchange.

2. Homemaking
The pair bond exchange is embedded so deeply in the infrastructure of family law that it can be hard to see. While cases like Faiman
and law review articles recognize marriage as a partnership in which
both spouses reasonably expect to share in the money that comes in
the door during the marriage, family law discourse tends too often to
see homemaking as a gift.
The 1993 divorce of Michael and Hildegard Borelli illustrates this
pattern. 14 2 Seventy-something San Francisco businessman Michael
138. Id. at *4.
139. Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Mari·
tal A,,,areements, 46 FAA!. L.Q. 313, 318-19, 321 (2012).
140. NANCY F. COTT. P UBLIC Vows : A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11 (2000).
14 l. Katharine B. Silbaugh. Marriage Contracts and th e Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 65. 135 (1998).
142. Borelli v. Brusseau. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (CaJ. Ct. App. 1993).
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Borelli married Hildegard in 1980, when she was thirty-nine. 143 The
day before their wedding, they signed a premarital agreement that
reserved most of his property-worth around $1.5 million-for his
daughter from a prior marriage. 144 Unlike Claire Faiman, Hildegard
did not challenge the prenup's validity. Instead, she sought to enforce
an oral agreement they made later to modify it. 145 That oral agreement brought their arrangement back toward the pair bond exchange
and California's general rule that spouses share property acquired
during the marriage. 14 6
Within a few years of getting married, Michael suffered heart problems and a stroke. 14 7 By 1988, his doctors recommended that he live in
a nursing home because he needed constant care. 148 Understandably,
he preferred to live at home, even though he and Hildegard would
have to modify their house. 1' 19 Maybe he realized that his reduced marital obligations under their prenup would justify Hildegard in feeling
less obliged under the caretaking half of the pair bond exchange. In
any case, Michael offered to alter the prenup by changing his will to
give Hildegard some of his property- around $500,000, including
money for her daughter's education-if she would disregard the doctors' advice and provide the nursing care herself at their home. 150
Hildegard accepted and performed her part of their agreement,
personally providing 'round-the-clock nursing care for Michael until
his death a year later. 15 1 But Michael never changed his will. 152 She
sued and lost because family law clung to the fiction that her caretaking was a pure gift even when Michael did not keep up his end of
the gift exchange. 153
To apply this double standard, the court had to ignore that Michael himself had slipped out of his obligations. Instead of noticing
Michael's property-hoarding prenup, it chastised Hildegard for trying
to do what Michael actually did- tailor the terms of the marriage
contract- declaring that Hildegard could not adjust those terms because "a wife is obligated by the marriage contract to provide nursing

143. Id. at 17.
144. ld.; Wendy L. Hillger, Note, Borelli v. Brusseau: Must a Spouse Also Be a Registered Nurse? A Feminist Critique. 25 PAC. L.J. 1387. 1414-16 (1994).
145. Borelli. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17-18.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 17.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. a t 18.
153. ld.
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type care to an ill husband.'%~ Citing pre-World War II cases, the
court in Borelli said that a husband's agreement to compensate a
wife undermines the public policy of wives caring for husbands. 155
Hildegard, as the spouse whose contributions came in the form of
care, feeding, and cleaning, had no right to contractually adjust her
side of the deal. The court waxed sentimental to justify depriving h er
of that contractual freedom:
[T]he marital duty of support under [California law] includes caxing for a s pouse who is ill. ... [Itl means more than the physical
care someone could be hil"ed to provide. Such support also encompasses sympathy[,] comfort[,] love, companionship and affection.
Thus, the duty of support can no more be "delegated" to a third
party t han the statutory duties of fidelity and mutual respect. 156

The court's contempt for Hildegard's conduct as "sickbed bargaining"
and "unseemly" is unfair, given Michael's earlier bargaining to get
out of his support obligations.157 By concluding that "even if few
things are left that cannot command a price, marital support r emains
one of them," 158 the court simply ignored the fact t hat family law allowed Michael, as a financial provider, to contract out of his side of
the pair bond exchange. I have criticized this double standard elsewhere, as have other scholars. 159
While family law treats t he caregiving part of pair bond exchanges
as something between a binding contract and a mere deal, the next
Section shows that it treats promises of fidelity- the third element of
pair bond exchanges- as a mere deal.

3. Fidelity
Over t he past few decades family law has demoted promises of
marital fidelity from contracts to mere deals. Until the 1970s, divorce
required a showing of "fault" like adultery, the equivalent of a material breach of the marital contract that justified t he state severing
the relationship through divorce.160 In addition, the wronged spouse
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at. 20 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
See ERTMAN, supra note 7. at 182-83; JOAN W ILLIAMS, UNBENDING GE:NOER: WHY
FAMJ t.Y ANO WORK CONFLIC'l' ANO WH.AT'l'O Do .ABOU1'JT 114-20 (2000); ZE:t.fZER. supra note 74.
160. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum. 1991 BYU L. REV.
154.
155
156.
157.
158.
159.

79. 79 (1991) ("In the 1970s, a movemen t to reform divorce laws swept the United States,
leading to the widespread adopt.ion of no-fault grounds for divorce. Between 1970 and 1975,
more thru1 half of the states adopted some modem no-fault grow1d for divorce, and by 1985,
every American jurisdiction except one had adopted some generally available, explicit 11011fau lt ground for divorce.").
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could obtain the equivalent of damages through child custody, a wife
obtaining more property or alimony, or a husband getting to keep
more property and pay less alimony.1 61
Today's rule of no-fault divorce no longer requixes a showing of
adultery or other wrongdoing. Instead incompatibility is sufficient to
justify divorce. 162 In the language of contract doctrine, no fault divorce
allows spouses t o t erminate a contract by ending it for a reason other
than breach. Consequently, even the most formal- signed, sealed, delivered- fidelity agreement can get t reated as a mere deal. 163
Take the agreement of Bernard and Vergestene Cooper. 164 After
twenty-eight years of marriage Bernard had an affair in 2000, and
Vergestene wanted to separate.165 But Bernard wanted to stay married, so he signed a notarized, written promise that "if any of my indiscretions lead to and/or are cause of a separation or divorce ... I
will accept full responsibilit[y] of my action."166 That responsibility,
they agreed, meant that Vergesten e would get $2600 a month for
household expenses, half of Bernard's ret irement accounts, and life
and health insurance. 167
Things seemed fine for five more years, until Bernard abruptly
leased an apartment and moved out without telling Vergestene.1 68
When she and theix daughters finally located him, Bernard admitted
to continuing his affair. Vergestene filed for divorce and the trial court
entered an order that largely tracked the reconciliation agreement. 169
On appeal the Iowa Supreme Court demoted Bernard and
Vergestene's formal written reconciliation agreement to a mer e
deal. 170 It reasoned that spousal relationships cannot be governed by
"contracts that are plead and proved in the courts as if the matter
161. Wood house, su.pra note 36. a t. 2532.
162. 1J1 some states. a spouse can unilaterally allege the incompatibility, so that one
spouse can end the man:iage when the other prefers to s tay married 24 AM. JUR. 2D Di·
vorce and Separat,ion § 23 (2014).
163. 1J1 Diosdado u. Diosdado, the agreement was s igned during the marriage, but the
property would be transferred to the non-cheating spouse only upon divorce. 118 Cal. Rptr.
2d 494, 495 (Ca l. Ct. App. 2002). Another property transfer borne of adultery did get legally enforced. When t he husband transferred marital property to his wife to induce her not to
divorce him after she discovered an affair, finalizing the transfe r whi le they were still married, the court refused to find Lhat t he agree ment violated public policy and enforced it.
Dawbaw v. Dawbarn, 625 S.E.2d 186, 188 (N.C. Ct.. App. 2006); see also At.wood & Bix,
supra note 139. at 321-22.
164. Jn re Marriage of Cooper , 769 N.W.2d 582 (Iowa 2009).
165 Id. at 584.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 587.
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involved the timely delivery of a crate of oranges." 171 Holding Bernard
to his formal, written promise, the court said, would "create a bargaining environment" in marriage, and courts should not be part of
"the complex web of interpersonal relationships and the inevitable
he-said-she-said battles that would arise" if the agreement were enforced.172 Following a California case, the court concluded that enforcing the reconciliation agreement also would undermine the no-fault
provisions of divorce law, reintroducing "acrimonious" proceedings
that no-fault divorce meant to banish from the courtroom. 173
Cooper is wrongly decided. Nothing in the reported case indicates
that the Coopers tried to make adultery or other fault a precondition
for divorce. The formal, signed, notarized writing merely provided an
incentive for Bernard to keep his promise by allocating property to
Veregene if he strayed again. Rather than protecting some imagined
state of marriage that is free of all bargaining, the Iowa court created
an opportunity for cheaters to prosper by virtue of trusting spouses'
reliance on the cheaters' empty promises.
Marriage equality for same-sex couples may offer family law, family
lawyers, and same-sex couples themselves a chance to make legal obligations better match a couple's reasonable expectations in fidelity as
well as property-sharing, caregiving, and other matters. The remainder of this Article reviews empirical data on the pair bond exchanges of
same-sex and different-sex couples, looking first to numbers and then
to stories. A sense of how gay couples do and do not adopt different
pair bond exchanges could help policy makers and couples themselves
make informed choices about how the law does and should treat couples' agreements about money, housework, and sex.

II.

QUANTITATIVE DATA COMPARING HETEROSEXUAL
AND GAY PAIR BOND EXCHANGES

Heterosexual couples, by definition, include one man and one
woman, while gay couples are made up of either two men or two
women. This gender difference has led sociologists to compare gay
and straight couples to tease out the role of gender in relationships. 174
While that research has delved into many aspects of intimacy, here
we focus on differences in the three main elements of the pair bond
exchange: money, housework, and sex.

171. Id. at 586.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 586-87 (citing Diosdado v. Diosdado, l 18 Cal. Rptr . 2d 494, 496 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002)).
174. See, e.g., PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER S CHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY.
WO.RI<. SEX (1983).
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University of Chicago economist Dan Black and his colleagues
used data collected in the 2000 Census to compare same-sex and different-sex couples.175 Black reasoned that couples who do have children would specialize more because the expenses (time, finances, effort, opportunity costs) of raising children are most efficiency borne
by one partner specializing in homemaking and the other in wage
labor. 176 He predicted that if gays are less likely than straights to
have children, then they would specialize less. That lack of specialization, he hypothesized, would result in gay men not engaging as intensely in wage labor as heterosexual men, and lesbians engaging in
wage labor more intensely t han straight women. 177 Likewise, he predicted that gay and lesbian couples would more equitably share
household chores than straight couples. 178
To compare gay and straigh t couples requires comparing whether
gays and straights couple at equivalent rates. According to the General Social Survey, a commonly used database which pools data from
surveys from 1989 to 2004, 179 lesbians and heterosexuals partner at
about the same rate- sixty-three percent and fifty-nine percent, respectively- and gay men at a slightly lower rate of fifty percent. 180
Thus, data about gays, lesbians, and straight men and women generally should tell us something about the kind of pair bond exchanges
each kind of couple is likely to make.
A. Property and Income Sharing

While women have enjoyed higher earnings over the past few decades, and men's r elative earning power has declined as the American
economy has transitioned from manufacturing to services and information,181 men still make more than women, on average. True, women represent half of the American workforce, bringing home more of
the family income than they used to. A 2005 study found that about a
quarter of married women make more than their husbands. 182 But
that pattern lasted more than three years for only sixty percent of
those couples, and on average women still work fewer hours for lower
wages, only bringing home thirty-seven percent of the average fami-

175. Black et al .. supra note 11.
176. Id. at 61. 66.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 62.
179. NAT'L OPINION .RESEARCH CTR., GENERAL SOCIAL S URVEY, http://www3.norc.org/
GSS+Website/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
180. Black et al., supra note 11. at 56.
18l. See generally MUNOY. supra note 62. at 51-55.
182. See Shelly Lw1dberg & Robert A. Pollak, The American Family and Family Economics. 21 J. ECON. PE: RSPE:CTIV~:s 3, 7-8 (2007).
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ly's income as of 2009. 183 Along the same lines, a 2004 study showed
that over their prime earning years American women earn thirtyeight percent of men's wages.184 Because less than five percent of
people identify as gay or lesbian, 185 most of the people in these studies wer e heterosexual.
Those income differences are due in part to patterns in what majors and careers heterosexuals, gay men, and lesbians choose. According to the 2000 Census, a comparison of partnered men and women
aged twenty-five to sixty indicates that men in gay partnerships have
"moderat ely" lower wages and income than men in heterosexual relationships (married or unmarried).186 Partnered lesbians, in contrast,
have "moderately higher wages and substantially higher income"
than corr esponding heterosexual women.187 Along the same lines, gay
men are more likely than other men to work in st ereotypically female
occupations like education and the fine arts, and are slightly less
likely than other men to pursue graduate education. Gay men also
tend to work fewer hours per week and fewer weeks per year.188
Likewise, lesbians are more likely than other women to work in stereotypically masculine occupations like engineering, economics, and
business and more likely t o pursue more education, opt for a profession that enjoys higher pay, remain continuously attached to the labor force, and work long hours. 189 These patterns produce more income equality within gay and lesbian couples than within straight
couples.190
Household income reflects these patterns. A household made of
lesbian partners is similar to a heterosexual couple, while a gay male
couple enjoys about twenty-five percent more income. 191 That difference may well be due to the presence of children in people's lives.
Children, of course, require t ending that results in their caretaker soften female-engaging less in income-generating activities than
they might otherwise.
Many gay people have kids, though not as many as het erosexuals.
One would expect as much, given the history of social and de jure dis183. ld.; BUREAU OF LABOR S TATlSTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR. WOMEN rN 'rHE LABOR
FORCE: ADATABOOK 2 (2011). available at h ttp://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf.databook-2011.pdf.
184. WILLIAMS, supra note 67. at 26.
185. Black et a l. , supra note 11, at 54.
186. Id. at 64.
187. Id. a t 65.
188. Id. at 65-66.
189. Id. at 64-66.
190. Id. at 62; Gotta et al., supra note 12. a i 364; Sondra E. Solomon el a l., Money,
Housework, Sex, and Co11,flicl: Same-Sex Couples i11 Civil Un.ions, Those Nol in Civil Unions, and Heterosexual Manied Siblings, 52 S~:x ROLES 561, 565-67 (2005).
191. Black et al., supra note 11, at 67.
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crimination against gay people and the biological fact that gay sex
does not produce unintended pregnancy. According to Williams Institute demographer Gary Gates, the 2008 General Social Survey r eports that forty-nine percent of lesbians and bisexual women and
t wenty percent of gay and bisexual men say they have had a child}92
Heterosexuals, in contrast, have parenthood rates of between forty
and forty-eight percent. 193 A 2005 study compared gay couples who
entered civil unions in Vermont and gay couples who did not get "civil unionized" with the heterosexual married siblings of both groups. I t
found that eighty percent of the married women had children, compared to thirty-four percent of women in civil unions and thirty-one
percent of women not in civil unions. 194 In contrast, eighty-two percent of heterosexual men in that study had children, compared to fifteen percent of the men in civil unions and just t en percent of the gay
men not in civil unions. t 95 Together, these data s uggest that heterosexuals are most likely to have children, followed by lesbians, with
gay men least likely to be parents.
Those structural factors- more engagement in well-remunerated
wage labor for straight men and lesbians and greater likelihood of
heterosexual women to have kids than gay men-both reflect and
reinforce cultural norms. Boys and men are generally socialized to
believe that being a good provider translates to being a good man,
while women and girls are still socialized to believe that being a good
mother and caretaker translates to being a good woman. 196

B. Homemaking
Because gay and lesbian couples are less likely t han their heterosexual counterparts to be parents, they are less likely t o have one
partner at home full-time.197 But among the gay and lesbian couples
that have children, rates of stark specialization-one partner at
home full-time-are comparable to the rates among heterosexual
parents . As of the 2000 Census, about a quarter of lesbian households
raising children had one partner at home full-time, just below the

192. GARY ,J. GATES. Wl LLIAMS INST., LG BT PARENTING IN THE UNITIW STATES (2013).
available al http://wiUiamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-conient/uploadsfLGBT-Parenting.pdf.
193. Id.; GARY J. GATES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON FA.<\1. RELATIONS, FAi\filY FOR.M.ATJON AND
RAISING CHILDREN AMONG SAME·SEX COUPLES. at F2. F3 (2011). available at
h ttp://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp·Contentluploads/Gates·Badgett-NCFR·LGBTFamilies·December-2011.pdf. These data are made messy by the fact that a good number of
gay people with kids conceived them in a heterosexual relationship and then came out. so
that the same child would count for both categories.
194. Solomon et al., supra note 190, at 565.
195. Id. at 568.
196. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 11, ai 168; SCHULTE. supra note 63. 158-59.
197. Black et al.• supra note 11, at 62-63.
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rate-one-third-for heterosexuals and gay male parents. 198 Among
heterosexuals, women are more than twice as likely to be the athome parent. 199 For all three types of couples, the one pursuing wage
labor is likely to be more educated. 200
But differences emerge bet ween heterosexual and LGBT households when it comes to paying the mortgage and divvying up household chores, even among households raising kids. A 2010 study reported that when one lesbian mom is home full-time and the other
works outside of the home, the two share parenting much more than
het erosexual couples. 201 Pepper Schwartz and Philip Blumstein's
classic 1983 study American Couples found t hat gay men who had
been married to women shared housework more equitably with their
male partners than they had with their wives. 202 A 2005 study found
that same-sex couples more equitably divided housework even when
one earned more money.203
That pattern may be changing. A 2011 study compared data on
straight, lesbian, and gay relationships in 1975 and 2000. Consistent
with other research, it found that in both t ime periods lesbian and
gay couples reported more equality in household tasks than heterosexual couples. 204 But it also revealed t hat while heterosexual couples
in the 2000 data set still tended to assign household tasks based on
gender (vacuuming for women, household repairs for men), during
the two periods studied, men in straight couples took on more feminine household labor and gays and lesbians reported less equitable
sharing of household labor in 2000 than they did in 1975.205 As we
will see in Part III on qualitative measures of pair bond exchanges,
gay and lesbian couples may become more willing to recognize and discuss inequality in their household arrangement as the legit imacy that
comes with same-sex marriage and other victories of the LGBT rights
movement reduces the need for gay couples to see themselves as different-and sometimes better-than heterosexuals in some other way.

C. Fidelity
Differences play out in different ways when it comes to sex. One
element of conventional pair bond exchanges-sexual exclusivity-is
198. ld.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Rachel H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families:
Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter?. 14 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL Ser. 164 (2010).
202. M UNDY, supra note 62.
203. See, e.g., Solomon et al.. supra note 190. at 572.
204. See Gotta et a l.. supra note 12.
205. Id. at 361.
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generally deemed not legally relevant. In the 1980s and 1990s, when
no state allowed same-sex couples to register their relationships, sex
did play a role in the terms of relationship agreements, which were
the most common way to create legal "us-ness." Prior to the widespread acceptance of cohabitation agreements, same-sex sexuality
was so outre that merely mentioning sexuality in a living-together
agreement could get it kicked out of court for being "meretricious," or
akin to prostitution. 206 For some years now, however, courts have
been willing to treat sex as just one part of a relationship. 207 Just to
be safe, however, practitioners strongly counsel against including any
mention of a couple's sexual relationship in their cohabitation
agreement. 208
Yet agreements about sex play a crucial role in many, if not most,
couples' relationships. That mismatch between legal rules and the
lived experiences of couples can be addressed by finding a term to
describe the agreements that family law ignores. I call them "deals"
to distinguish them from "contracts," which black letter law defines
as promises that the law enforces.209
Unlike the money and-to a lesser extent-housework provisions
of the pair bond exchange, the sex terms of pair bond exchanges are
generally quite different in gay male relationships than straight and
lesbian ones. Gay men are much more likely to make agreements
that allow for sex with partners outside of the relationship. A 2005
study by Sondra Solomon fleshes out these differences by comparing
three groups: "civil-unionized" gay-male and lesbian couples, gay and
lesbian couples not in civil unions, and the heterosexual married siblings of the other subjects. 210 The researchers found that only half of
gay men in civil unions reported having explicit agreements that sex
outside their relationship was not okay, a much lower rate of monogamy agreements than heterosexual husbands had with their wives
(seventy-five percent). 211 Among gay male couples not in civil unions,
only a third made agreements to remain monogamous. 212 Consistent
with these agreements, over half of all the gay men studied had sex
outside their relationship, compared to only fifteen percent of the
heterosexual men.

206. ,Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rplr. 130, 134 (Cal . CL. App. 1981) .
207. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
208. RALPH WARNER, TONJ IBARA & FREDERICK HERTZ, LJVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL
GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED COUPLES 25 (15th ed. 2013).
209. ERTMAN. supra note 7. at xi.
210. Solomon et aL supra note 190.

21 1. Id.
212. Id. at 571.
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Surprisingly, all t hat extra-curricular sex seems not to make gay
male couples more likely to break up. 213 While gay men are less likely
to couple-up than lesbians, when they do establish a life together as a
couple, those gay male couples are more likely to stay together.2 t 4
That may be due to explicit deals about the conditions under which
they can have sex with people outside of the relationship. Agreeing
that sex outside the relationship-often with conditions about where
and with whom- is much more common in gay male relationships
than among either lesbians or heterosexual spouses. 215 More than
forty percent of the gay male couples-both registered and nonregistered-in the Solomon study had agreements that allowed sex
with people outside their relationship, compared to only five percent
of lesbians and heterosexual couples.216 Another study, published in
2010 and based on data collected in 2002, surveyed thirty-nine gay
male couples in San Francisco's Bay Area about their agreements
about monogamy. Those researchers found that only thirty-one percent of the couples reported agreeing to be monogamous, and even
those conceded that they defined monogamy to allow for situations
like a masseur giving his clients a "happy ending," which is spa lingo
for an end-of-the-massage orgasm. 2 t 7 Explicit non-monogamy agreements were twice as common-reported by sixty-four percent of the
Bay Area couples- but even then, many of the couples set limits like
both of them being present at the encounter or separating emotional
from sexual interaction by designating friends and ex-lovers as forbidden fruit. 218
In marked contrast to the often open relationships of gay men, the
lesbian and straight couples in Solomon's Vermont study reported
very different agreements. Only five percent of both lesbian and heterosexual married couples had non-monogamy agreements (a rate
that held for both registered and non-registered couples). 219
Those numbers, while important, do little to convey the social,
emotional, and other details of pair bond exchanges. Accordingly, we
now turn to qualitative material.

213. Fewer than ten percenL of t he gay men in the study reported having had a "meaningful love affair" outside their relationships. much less t han one would expect with fi{'ty
percenL rates of extra-rela t ionship sexuality. Td. aL 574.
214. RICHMAN, supra note 31, at xx; Hunter. supra note 16, at 1867.
215. Colleen C. Hoff & Sean C. Beougher. Sexual Agreements Among Gay Male Couples, 39 ARCH IVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 774. 778 (2010).
216. Id.; Solomon et al., supra note 190. at 573.
217. Hoff & Beougher, supra note 215, at 777. For a defini t ion of "happy ending," see
Anitra Brown, Happy Ending Massage, ABOUT.COM, http:llspas.about.com/od/spaglossary/
g/Happy-Ending-Massage.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
218. Hoff & Beougher, supra note 215, at 778.
219. Solomon et al .. supra note 190. at 573.
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III. QUALITATIVE D ATA COMPARING THE PAIR BOND
E XCHANGES OF STRAIGHT AND GAY COUPLES

Stories of family life and family law breathe life into all the numerical data in the prior Section. As with Part II, the following discussion illustrates the numerical data on pair bond exchanges with
stories drawn from the trenches of family law and ethnographic work
on same-sex couples. As a whole, they indicate that many same-sex
couples commonly expect different things from family-and thus
from family law-than different-sex spouses do.
Philadelphia lawyer Margaret !<law's book Keeping It Civil vividly
portrays the details of a family lawyer's docket.220 Among the sometimes surprising stories she tells from three decades of practicing
family law is Klaw's observation that men getting divorced are generally "fundamentally comfortable with the idea that [they] will need
to provide for [their wives] after they're no longer married." 22 1 Rather
than resist the very idea of alimony or property sharing, most men
"takeO pride" in being "a provider," so much so that Kla w says that a
man's ability to keep his family comfortable after a divorce is often a
"mark of social status" for both high-earning and other men. 222 The
tight link between masculinity and financially supporting your family is illustrated by a conversation she had in the course of representing the wife in a divorce. The attorney for the husband-a rougharound-the-edges fellow who also practices criminal law- told Klaw
that he had discouraged his male client from pursuing alimony from
Klaw's client: "'My guy asked me if he could get alimony from your
lady, and I told him, yeah, maybe, but don't be a pussy.' "223 Klaw's
female clients do not expect to share their retirement accounts with
their husbands and "almost to a woman, they become apoplectic at
the prospect of paying alimony ."22' 1 She believes that these women
who earn more than their underemployed or non-working husbands
are "deeply disappointed that they married men who didn't carry
their weight financially" because the women did not grow up expecting to be the main providers for their families. 225
Many gay people feel differently. Though some gays come out in
mid-life, after years or even decades in heterosexual relationships, a
good number of gay people know early on that they are unlikely to be
either a provider or someone who takes care of the home front as part
of a heterosexual pair bond exchange. One couple, Scott and Mike,
220. KLAw, supra note 67.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 64.
Id.
Id.

225.

la. a t 65.

Id.

2015)

MARITAL CONTRACTING

511

who had been together for a dozen years before getting married in a
small civil ceremony at Cambridge City Hall in Massachusetts, purposely kept it small to reflect their "adamant" belief that "they did
not seek any kind of blessing, religious or otherwise." 226 They told sociologist Kim Richman that their feelings about marriage were different than straight couples:
If your whole mind-set is that it's not an option you kind of change
your whole life around that it doesn't mean what it might mean to
straight people. As a gay person you just don't think there's ever
that option so you don't look to that for your security. You make
your own security. 221

Mignon Moore's recent study of African-American lesbians reported
that this view was held by "the overwhelming majority" of the couples studied. As one subject in Moore's study put it, "I don't give a
damn who you're with, you always need to be able to be independent
and take care of yourself."228
While Richman's subjects Scott and Mike emphasized the link between their gay identity and self-sufficiency, Moore's subjects had a
different focus depending on their class. Women from working class
backgrounds saw everyone in the household as having an equal responsibility to contribute financially, and they also wanted to have
the income to escape an unstable or unhealthy relationship. 229 Middle
and upper middle class women in her study, in contrast, viewed economic self-sufficiency as important because it furthers personal
growth and self-actualization.23° In either case, Moore's black lesbian
couples saw prolonged unemployment as a "deal breaker,"231 a phrase
that underlines the contractual expectations within the relationship.
Gay people coming of age in a post-Goodrich and post- Windsor
world may feel differently, and subgroups of gay people (AfricanAmericans, say, or lesbians) may well retain a preference for economic self-sufficiency. Moore and Richman both collected their data in
the first decade of the twenty-first century.232 That data is largely
drawn from pre-Millennials who came of age when sodomy was still a
crime and were old enough to have begun and ended a few big relationships before marriage equality began to become a legal reality.
Since the state would not recognize their "us-ness," they logically re-

226. RrCflNLAN, supra note 31. at 70.
227. Id. (emphasis added).
228. MOORE. supra note 11. at 153.
229. Id. at 158.
230. Id.
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sponded by building their lives around self-sufficiency more than
similarly situated heterosexual men and women.
In the 1990s many same-sex couples created living-together
agreements, powers of attorney, and wills to cobble together a semblance of the legal, social, and emotional "us-ness" that the state
grants through marriage. Many used forms provided in Nolo books
like Living Together: A Legal Guide for Unmarried Couples.233 The
latest edition of this series reflects the altered landscape that Windsor and Goodrich have created by giving s pecific advice on whether
couples should formalize their relationship through contracts, marriage, or registering with the state under domestic partnership or
civil union laws.234 In chapters titled "What it Means to be Married,"
"Ten Steps to a Decision," "To Prenup or Not t o Prenup," and "Avoiding the Ugly Gay Divorce," seasoned practitioner Fred Hertz counsels
same-sex couples to think carefully through the financial, social, and
emotional consequences of exercising their newly acquired right to
marry. 235 As he quips, "the right to marry is not the duty to marry."236
Hertz focuses on fairness as well as people knowing what they are
signing onto in getting married, including practical and emotional
aspects of whatever family form a couple chooses. Pragmatically, he
instructs, it is easier to not share money socked away in a retirement
account during the r elationship because dividing that asset is notoriously complex. 237 But that may be unfair if one person has a much
higher income or more savings, especially if they have a pair bond
exchange where the other focuses on maintaining order on t he home
front. Speaking from years of experience counseling clients, Hertz
acknowledges a disconnect between most gay people's expectations
about property sharing and family law's general unwillingness to divide property based on bad actions like cheating or abuse:
Many, many people feel fine about taking care of a partner while
the relationship is intact and can even imagine s plitting up assets
if th e relationship ends by mut ual agreement. But those same
people often balk when they think about sharing with a partner
who has betrayed them sexually or left them precipitously for reasons t hey don't understand. 238

233. D ENJS CLIFFORD. FREDERICK H ERTZ & EMILY D os1<0w. A LEGAL GUIDE FOR
LESBlAN & GAY COUPLES (14th ed. 2007).
234. FREDERICK C. HERTZ & EMlLY D OSKOW, MAKING I T LEGAL: A GUIDE TO SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS & CIVIL UNIONS (Lina Guillen ed.. 3d ed. 2014).
235. Id.
236. E-mail from Frederick Hertz. altorney. to author (Aug. 15, 2014) (on file with author).
237. H~:wrz & D OSKOW, supra note 234, at 176.
238. Id. at 166.
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That advice suggests that family lawyers may be in the habit of
counseling clients that property-hoarding may be the easiest way to
go, at least for the higher-earning person in a couple. But if Windsor
alters the social meaning of marriage-and being gay-practitioners
may come to encourage more "us-ness" among same-sex spouses, reflecting spouses' evolving expectations.
Sociologist Judith Stacey provides another front-row account of
the intricacies of same-sex relationships, but from the perspective of
an ethnographer rather than a legal problem solver. Her book Unhitched documents the details-including contracts and deals about
money, house-keeping, and sex-of a number of gay-male family arrangements in Los Angeles. 239 Unlike attorney Fred Hertz, who tends
to see clients when they are either in, anticipating, or trying to avoid
legal disputes, Stacey collected a snowball sample of gay couples,
asked them lots of questions, and observed how they live their lives.
Having done most of her data collection before her subjects could get
married or otherwise register with the state, she witnessed gay couples' ingenuity in cobbling together deals that work for them, concluding that gay people are "at once freer and more obliged than most
of the rest of us to craft the basic terms of their romantic and domestic unions." 240 The agreements she documents among gay parents,
which she describes as "thoughtful, magnanimous, [and] childcentered," must help them function as a family, because most of them
were still intact and getting along when she checked in with them a
decade after her initial research. 241
But most couples do not hire attorneys to commit these promises
to paper, nor do they even talk through their intentions about who
owns how much of what or for how long, as Stacey's subjects did.
Moreover, changed circumstances can decrease the usefulness of even
the most carefully thought-through agreement. Consider Sandy and
Fran, a couple whose break-up Fred Hertz characterizes as "explosive."242 Though they started off with roughly equal commitments to
wage earning and tending the home fires, that changed when their
disabled son came into the picture and Sandy's aging parents needed
help. Sandy cut back on her high-tech consulting business, while
Fran upped the on-call hours of her medical practice, moving more
into the husbandly provider role. Resentment on both sides bubbled

239. JUOl'l' H $ 'l'ACEY. UNHl'l'CHEO: LOVE. MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY VALUES FROM WEST
HOLLYWOOD TO WESTERN CHINA (2011).
240.
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up over the years and eventually boiled over, leading to an acrimonious divorce. 243
One reason that break-ups like Sandy and Fran's can get so ugly
is that many couples live out a different pair bond exchange than at
least one of them thinks they have. The studies that show equal sharing of household tasks in same-sex couples generally gather data by
having couples self-report their practices. Two sociologists who have
done ethnographic research on same-sex couple householdsChristopher Carrington and Mignon Moore-contend that couples
believe in equality but divide homemaking labor unequally.
According to Carrington, studies of gay and lesbian couples prior
t o the 1970s reported role s pecialization, with one partner playing a
butch role by providing financially and the other playing a femme
role by taking on responsibility for many or most household tasks. 24'1
This is quite different from the conventional wisdom about relative
equality in gay couples that researchers since the 1970s have documented based on t he couples' self-reporting. Yet both Carrington's
1998 study and Mignon's 2011 study suggest that couples do not divide the housework as equitably as they report. The couples that
Carrington and Mignon interviewed and observed closely over time
reflected t he belief in equity, reporting equal sharing of housework. 24 5
But their actual observations, painstakingly recorded during daysand in Carrington's case, weeks-of observing couples cooking, cleaning, grocery shopping, and otherwise keeping house, revealed a different story .246
The couples' actions were actually closer to the pair bond exchange in which one person in a couple performs most of the work
that makes a house a home. Take Narvin and Lawrence, a couple in
Carrington's study. Narvin's Ivy-League MBA yielded a much higher
income than Lawrence's nursing degree and required many more
hours of work each week. 247 After a difficult period in which Lawrence's r esearch job kept him away evenings, he scaled back by taking a day-shift nursing position and taking care of "stuff ... from
laundry to shopping ... trying to get the house to feel more like a
home."248 Carrington s uggests that what he calls the "egalitarian
myth" is supported by homemakers themselves, who downplay their
cont ributions or actively conceal t he many tasks it takes to keep a
243. Id. at 178-79.
244. CHRISTOPHER CARRINGTON, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY
LIFE AMONG LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 12. 176-77 (1999).
245. Id. at 5, 176-77; MOORE, supra note 11. at 161.
246. See CARRINGTON, supra note 244, at 176-77; MOORE, supra note 11. at 161.
247. CARRINGTON, supra note 244, a t ] 98.
248. Id. at 199.
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household running smoothly.249 He describes a conversation he had
with Sarah, a graphic artist who works at home, squeezes in domestic tasks throughout the day, making sure to get the laundry folded
before her partner Andrea gets home.250 When pressed to say why it
had to happen then, Sarah explained, "I just don't want her to have
to deal with it. I really like us to be able to have quality time when
she gets here. She has enough pressure to deal with at work, so I try
t o keep this kind of stuff out of the way."25 1
Moore's couples, who included many women who had become
mothers in earlier r elationships with men, tended to allocate most of
the homemaking labor and financial decision-making to the biological
mothers. 252 The lesbian part ners of bio-moms value this work, Moore
found, when she realized that the stepmothers reported that the biomoms spend more time each week on household labor than the biomoms did themselves. 253 (Heterosexual men, in contrast, exaggerate
the time they spend on homemaking tasks and underestimate the
time their female pa1·tners spend on those tasks.) 2"'1 As Jocelyn, a biomom in Moore's study put it,
I'm the domestic
just think I wash
over the sink for
does volunteer to

person, I do the cooking, I do the laundry.... I
dish es faster than h er. So instead of her standing
an hour, we can have more quality time. So sh e
do it, and I'll say, "Oh no, I'll do it." 255

Sarah and Jocelyn's careful management of the emotional t enor of
their evenings-not to mention the laundry and the dishes- is the
kind of task that remains invisible when done well. Yet that invisibility, coupled with larger social, legal, and economic devaluation of
much of this work as menial or inferior "women's work," may make it
harder for same-sex couples to see the extent to which their relationships include the kind of pair bond exchanges that shape many differ ent-sex marriages.
Same-sex couples' self-reporting may more closely reflect their
pair bond exchanges as t he day-to-day r eality of living in a relationship that both law and society recognize sinks into gay couples' consciousness and habits. The fourth and final Part of this Article identifies t hree additional things that researchers should notice as they
study the evolution of families and family law in the age of marriage
equality.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
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255.
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IV. FORECASTING WHETHER MARRIAGE EQUALITY WILL CHANGE
MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE-RELATED DOCTRINES

This Article's examination of pair bond exchanges helps ground
predictions about whether marriage equality will change marriage or
gay people, or both. While there is not much data yet, the studies
done to date suggest that the change may well go in both directions.
Therefore students of the family should keep an eye on three things:
(1) same-sex couples' children, (2) ethnographers who chart the way
families actually divvy up financial and homemaking tasks, and (3) the
heterosexuals. But only the third item is likely to alter family law.
A. Watch the Children

One would expect that as gay and lesbian couples enjoy more legal
and social support, more of them will be raising children. But that
change will play out differently among subgroups in the LGBT community.256 As of the 2010 Census, same-sex couples who consider
themselves to be spouses are more than twice as likely to be raising
biological, step, or adopted children when compared to same-sex couples who say they are unmarried partners. 257 We saw in Parts II and
III, above, that many of these parents are investing in their families
by having one spouse spend more time and effort as breadwinners
and the other spend more time making sandwiches, with gay couples
raising children being just about as likely as straight couples to have
one person at home full-time. But contrary to that expectation, the
so-called "gayby boom" has not steadily increased the prevalence of
gay men or lesbians raising children.
Acco1·ding to Williams Institute demographer Gary Gates, U.S.
Census Bureau data indicate that in 1990 twelve percent of unmarried same-sex couples were raising kids, a rate that increased to
nineteen percent in 2006 and then decreased again to sixteen percent
in 2009. 258 Gates explains these surprising data by pointing out that
some ways that gays and lesbians become parents have increasedas one would expect- while others have decreased. The likelihood of
becoming a parent via adoption nearly doubled between 2000 and
2009, increasing from ten percent of unmarried same-sex partner
households to nineteen percent. 259 That increase, however, is offset by
decreases in LGBT becoming parents at a young age. Those two
trends are compatible if we assume that marriage equality and other
256. See J UNE CARBONE & N AOMI CAHN , MARRIAGE MARKETS: How INEQUALITY ls
(2014) (discussing Lh e effect of race and socioeconomic
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forms of legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships has made birth
moms, agencies, and others in the adoption process more open to placing a child with a same-sex couple at the same time it eased the way
for young adults t o acknowledge their sexuality and thereby avoid having a child in a heterosexual relationship before coming out. 260
If Dan Black and his colleagues are correct that the expectation
and experience of raising children causes men to engage in wage labor more heavily, and women less heavily, on average, and gay people increasingly have children, then marriage could well be pushing
same-sex couples to enter pair bond exchanges more like heterosexual couples. Indeed, Nan Hunter sees "at least some indicators that
t he degree of difference between gay and straight, although still significant, is decreasing."261 A 2011 study that compared same-sex and
heterosexual couples in 1975 and 2000 found that while straight couples report more equal sharing of housework in 2000 than twentyfive years earlier, the reverse trend-a reduction of equalityoccurred for same-sex couples.262 Consistent with theories about the
efficiency of having one person spend m01·e time keeping house while
t he other spends more t ime keeping up th e bank account, gay and
lesbian couples divided financial obligations for the household less
equally in 2000 than in 1975.2 63
Different people will interpret these data differently. Hunter, for
example, expects that fewer people will have children-gay or
straight- and t hat family law may evolve to provide different rules
for relationships wit h kids t han relationships without t hem. 264 I expect to see differences based on race, class, and age. If whites and
college graduates are more likely to marry than African-Americans
and those wit hout college degrees, that pattern is likely to play out
with black same-sex couples. Millennials who came of age with samesex marriage as either a reality in their jurisdiction or a possibility
on the horizon may tailor their educational and occupational plans
with children in mind. In contrast, many Boomers, and perhaps Generation X as well, who came of age thinking of themselves as different from their heterosexual counterparts, may expect and experience
more self-sufficiency than specializat ion in their couple relationships.
Take forty-something lawyer Lisa Padilla, who married fiftysomething businesswoman Allison Klein in 2011. Instead of merging
260. Id.
261. Hw1ter, supra note 16. at 1865-66.
262. Gotta et al., supra note 12, at 361-62.
263. Id. at. 370. On Lhe sexual front. all three kinds of couples were more monogamous
in 2000 than in 1975-a result like ly due to t he AIDS epidemic and othe1· cultura l changes-and more couples made explicit agreements to remain monogamous in 2000 than in
l 975. Id. at 366, 371.
264. Hw1ter, supra note 16, at 1877.
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all of their finances, they signed a prenup to protect the retirement
funds each had built up during successful careers. 265
Many of the same-sex marriages currently taking place represent
a back log of people who were blocked from marring for years or even
decades of their r elat ionship. Data may change once gay couples are
marrying around the same age as different -sex couples do.

B. Watch the Ethnographers
Family ethnographers such as Judith Stacey, Christopher Carrington, and Mignon Moore provide equally relevant data about the
fine-grained details of family life. By charting the deals and contracts
that couples make, and the extent to which their daily lives match
those agreements, ethnographies can chart the differences between
the marital arrangements people think they have and t he ones they
are actually living out.
Columbia law professor Katherine Franke is not a demographer,
yet she has flagged an issue that bears watching as well. As same-sex
marriage becomes an accepted part of the doctrinal and social landscape, Franke worries that the patterns of equality that same-sex
couples experience and expect may erode protections for primary
homemaking spouses in heterosexual marriages. 266 Although that
prospect seems unlikely, since same-sex marriages represent much
less than one percent of all marriages, 267 minority vanguards can
herald major social changes.268 It may well be that, as Nan Hunter
has predicted, family law could adapt to these changes by crafting
one set of rules for couples with children and another for childless
couples.

C. Watch the Heterosexuals
While minorities can and have brought about social and legal
change, it seems more likely that the LGBT community is just a convenient marker of social, economic, and political changes that the
larger society has its own reasons to embrace. As the U.S. economy
continues to move away from manufacturing and toward service and
information technologies, the economic and homemaking contributions of men and women, on average, are likely to continue undergo265. Louise Raf.kin, If "Forever" Doesn't Work Out: The Same-Sex Prenup. N.Y. 11MES.
(Mar. 23. 2012), h ttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/fashion/weddings/same-sex-marriageand-prenup tial-agreements.html'?pagewanted=all.
266. KATHE:RINE: FRANKE. WE:n-Loc1mo: THE RE:LATIONSHI P 01, MARHIAC~: 'l'O FHEIWOM
FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS AND SAME SEX COUPLES (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author).
267. Huntei·, supra note 16, at 1863.
268. See ALISSA QUART, REPUBLIC OF O UTSIDERS: THE POWER OF AMATEURS,
DRE:AMERS, ANO RE:BELS (2013).
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ing an expansion of women's wage earning and a contraction of economic opportunities of middle and working class men. 269 If heterosexual spouses seek out a more egalitarian version of pair bond exchanges, it will be because it works for them, not because the gays
got there first.
CONCLUSION

In a post- Windsor world both marriage and marital contracting
are likely to look a bit different than they have in the past, as will
gay and lesbian coupling. As oflate 2014, when over half of the states
and the federal government have extended marriage equality to
same-sex couples, couples in states that deny marriage equality will
continue to enter cohabitation and other agreements to create "usness" as same-sex couples have done for decades to make up for the
state's longstanding refusal to create rights and obligations and recognize same-sex couples as legitimate families. The terms of those
agreements likely reflect the lived experiences of many same-sex
couples, with more equal sharing of financial obligations and housework than in most heterosexual couples.
When, and if, the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a fundamental
right to marry that requires the states that still ban same-sex marriage to change course, that may change. When same-sex couples can
marry in every state, a good number of same-sex couples may balk
from the full-throttle property-sharing that the default rules of marriage entail. But I expect that just as the vast majority of regulated
communities opt for default rules instead of crafting their own
through private agreements, most people getting married will not
enter premarital agreements. Moreover, as the years expand the
number of same-sex spouses who interact with schools, hospitals, government agencies, and houses of worship-let alone family members,
friends, neighbors, and colleagues- gay and lesbian couples may be
less likely to think of themselves as different from different-sex couples. That assimilation may come alongside the continued heterosexualization of same-sex coupling, with more specialization in their pair
bond exchanges, especially among those couples with children.
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